Why does history matter to philosophy and the sciences? : selected essays / by Lorenz Krüger. Ed. by Thomas Sturm, Wolfgang Carl, and Lorraine Daston
Huvudupphovsman: | |
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Övriga upphovsmän: | , , |
Materialtyp: | Bok |
Språk: | German |
Publicerad: |
Berlin [u.a.] :
de Gruyter,
2005
|
Serie: | Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie
66 |
Ämnen: |
LEADER | 01680nam a22002891c 4500 | ||
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001 | a0011042 | ||
008 | 070404s2005 gw ger d | ||
005 | 20210811123309.0 | ||
020 | |a 3-11-018042-1 | ||
084 | |a PH 2D | ||
090 | |a PH 2D *Kru/Why | ||
100 | 1 | |a Krüger, Lorenz |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Why does history matter to philosophy and the sciences? |b selected essays |c by Lorenz Krüger. Ed. by Thomas Sturm, Wolfgang Carl, and Lorraine Daston |
264 | 1 | |a Berlin [u.a.] : |b de Gruyter, |c 2005 | |
300 | |a 275 S. | ||
490 | 1 | |a Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie |v 66 | |
500 | |a Literaturangaben | ||
505 | 1 | |a Did Kant aim to prove the completeness of his table of judgements? -- Was John Locke an Empiricist? -- Probebility in Leibniz -- Intertheoretic relations as a tool for the rational reconstruction of scientific development -- Reduction as a problem : some remarks on the history of statistical mechanics from a philosophical point of view -- Unity of science and cultural pluralism -- Are statistical explanations possible? -- Causality and freedom -- Matter for us and in itself : what are primary properties? -- Does progress in science lead to truth? -- Has the correspondence theory of truth been refuted? : from Gottlob Frege to Donals Davidson -- Does a science need knowledge of its history? -- Why do we study the history of philosophy? -- How philosophy and science came to differ | |
650 | 4 | |a Philosophie | |
650 | 4 | |a Wissenschaftstheorie | |
650 | 4 | |a Wissenschaftsphilosophie | |
655 | 4 | |a Aufsatzsammlung | |
700 | 1 | |a Sturm, Thomas |4 edt | |
700 | 1 | |a Carl, Wolfgang |4 edt | |
700 | 1 | |a Daston, Lorraine |4 edt | |
952 | |i 2007:458 | ||
099 | 1 | |a 20070404 |